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JAMES A. MARTIN
Paul D. Carrington*

Jim Martin was a natural. From the day he first took his seat in
August 1966 on the second row of the corner classroom in Hutchins
Hall, he had an instinctive perception of his role as a lawyer, which, so
far as I know, he never changed.
While he was quite capable of speculation about other ways of doing things, his mind readily accepted and even welcomed legal texts
and traditions as the parameters within which serious work was to
proceed. To him who had trained in mathematics, it was congenial to
isolate a legal problem from much of its context in order to achieve a
clearer focus on the import of the constraints of law. I am in danger
here of describing Jim as one of T. R. Powell's famous lawyers: one
who can think of something that is inextricably related to something
else without thinking about the something else. Jim could, indeed,
think that way as effectively as mo.st, but he always, or so I believe,
knew what he was doing in that regard. His was, I perceived, a moral
position, that judges ought to strive to hear and obey the law's command even when it produces results that are personally distasteful to
the persons applying the lash of power. He held that overcontextualization can obstruct performance of this moral obligation by rationalizing the self-indulgent instincts of judges, and thereby impair the
moral integrity of law.
·
Our differences in respect to this matter emerged during the summer of 1967, when I was fortunate to have Jim's services as a research
assistant. We worked on another project for most of the summer, but
when I left for a family vacation in July, I gave him my conception of
an article on which I hoped to commence work on my return. When I
returned a month later, Jim had a first draft of Substantive Interests
and the Jurisdiction of State Courts. 1 His was an extraordinary
achievement in bringing my crude notion to life, and we published the
article as co-authors.
I was aware, however, that Jim had from the first some misgivings
about the article, and I was not surprised when he told me in 1980 that
he thought our conclusion to be wrong. His view was to a degree
validated in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine 2 and Calder v. Jones. 3 In the
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latter of these companion cases, our article was unsuccessfully cited by
the defendant.
The thesis of our article, briefly stated, was that the fourteenth
amendment may tolerate a longer jurisdictional reach in some classes
of cases than others according to the nature of the substantive interests
being asserted by the parties. Our primary example, perhaps, was a
defamation case brought in Alabama state courts against a New York
publisher of an account of events occurring in the civil rights struggle
in Alabama. We urged that the courts are justified in recognizing the
special threat to first amendment values posed by the extension of
long-arm jurisdiction to sustain thinly disguised punitive proceedings
based on "contacts" perhaps barely adequate to justify jurisdiction in a
personal injury products liability case; we approved a holding that
those sometime sufficient contacts may be insufficient in a political defamation case.
It is not my purpose here to concede or to argue our difference,
and certainly not to criticize the outcome in the two 1984 cases, which
are distinguishable. Rather I wish to explain and to salute Jim's view,
which I associate with the concern for the moral integrity of the law
manifested in almost all the conversations I ever had with Jim about
Civil Procedure. His later view had been expressed at the time of our
writing by a student editor of the Columbia Law Review, who described our position as a "tampering with due process." His was not
merely a concern for the untidiness of mixing substance and procedure, but, far more important, a perception that the judge practicing
our suggested method of weighing substantive policy as a factor measuring the length of the long arm would abandon, or at least weaken,
his fidelity to the esteemed neutrality of legal principles. Jim Martin
had no fear of subtlety or complexity so long as they helped the judge
to comprehend and obey, with a minimum of manipulation to fit his
own preferences of outcome. Our article was, he feared, an invitation
to manipulation by courts who would tailor the length of long-arm
jurisdiction to suit their own political preferences, whatever those
might at the moment be. Thus it was, and perhaps others should
know, that the mature Jim Martin dissented from the article signed by
the youthful Jim Martin when overborne by his mentor, me.
While I remain unshaken in my own former view, I have come
greatly to value the moral source of my numerous adversaries' reluctance to acknowledge what is to me a manifest truth. Of course, Jim
was right that the moral duty of the judge to subordinate her preferences to the texts and the traditions of the law is a duty of paramount
importance, and not too much can be said to reinforce the community
of shared perceptions of lawyers and judges which make such moral
conduct of judges rewarding to themselves. In former times, we have
allowed or encouraged judges to hide behind that moral duty, to the
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neglect of other duties to reconcile law with emerging moral standards. But surely in these times, the risk is otherwise. Our professional world is full of precepts and examples which not only observe
and predict, but even encourage judges to neglect their duty to
subordinate themselves to the texts and traditions, to the reasoned expectations of others, which are the law. In such a world, Jim Martin
had a very special and very important role to play, a special burden to
bear. His students needed his example of a man who nurtured a
strong belief that legal texts and traditions should and do guide judicial conduct. And our professional world needed alumni who harbor
belief in that possibility.
For this reason, among others, Jim's premature death was a substantial loss to the law. The loss is ineffable, but no less certain on that
account. Because those who come later cannot hope to perceive this
kind of loss, I am grateful for this opportunity to take its notice. I
pray for Jim and for us that some of his students will pick up his
burden where he left it and will continue ·on the path he took.

